Abstract-We examine the merit of Bernoulli packet drops in actively detecting integrity attacks on control systems. The aim is to detect an adversary who delivers fake sensor measurements to a system operator in order to conceal their effect on the plant. Physical watermarks, or noisy additive Gaussian inputs, have been previously used to detect several classes of integrity attacks in control systems. In this paper, we consider the analysis and design of Gaussian physical watermarks in the presence of packet drops at the control input. On one hand, this enables analysis in a more general network setting. On the other hand, we observe that in certain cases, Bernoulli packet drops can improve detection performance relative to a purely Gaussian watermark. This motivates the joint design of a Bernoulli-Gaussian watermark which incorporates both an additive Gaussian input and a Bernoulli drop process. We characterize the effect of such a watermark on system performance as well as attack detectability in two separate design scenarios. Here, we consider a correlation detector for attack recognition. We then propose efficiently solvable optimization problems to intelligently select parameters of the Gaussian input and the Bernoulli drop process while addressing security and performance trade-offs. Finally, we provide numerical results which illustrate that a watermark with packet drops can indeed outperform a Gaussian watermark.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of cyber-physical systems (CPS) has become a critical issue [1] . Since CPS such as the smart grid, waste management systems, water distribution systems, transportation systems, and smart buildings are linked to critical infrastructures, it is imperative that they operate securely. Unfortunately, attacks have occurred against CPS. This includes Stuxnet [2] , which targeted uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, the Maroochy Shire incident [3] , an attack by a malicious insider on a sewage management system, and the Ukraine power attack [4] , a hack resulting in widespread blackouts in Ukraine. The threat does not appear to be over as the growing connectivity and heterogeneity of our system architectures provide new attack surfaces for adversaries.
We focus on detecting integrity attacks in control systems in the presence of packet drops at the control input. In an integrity attack, an adversary modifies inputs and sensor measurements in a control system. The goal of such an attacker may be to achieve some economic benefit or cause physical damage to a system. An attacker can potentially maximize his impact by hiding his presence from the operator. Remaining stealthy allows an attacker to affect the system for long periods of time without defender interference. The adversary can avoid detection by intelligently modifying the sensor measurements to fool detectors. One example is a replay attack, as used in Stuxnet, where an attacker replaces true outputs with a previously recorded sequence of measurements [5] .
We consider the use of physical watermarking to detect integrity attacks. A physical watermark is a noisy Gaussian signal added on top of an optimal control input to authenticate a system's dynamics. Physical watermarking is a method of active detection, where a defender alters his strategy to recognize attacks. These methods are necessary when standard fault detection methods provably fail [6] , [7] . Recent work has investigated physical watermarking. In [5] , [8] - [10] , the design of watermarks against replay attacks was examined. Additionally, [11] and [12] design asymptotic detectors in systems implementing physical watermarking to ensure zero additive distortion power is introduced into sensor measurements. Additionally, in a scalar setting, [13] demonstrates the optimality of Gaussian watermarks against Gaussian attackers and vice versa. [14] evaluates the use of non-stationary watermarks to hamper system identification. Finally, [15] considers watermarks to thwart adversaries who have access to a subset of inputs and model knowledge.
However, prior work fails to consider the scenario where there exists packet drops in the network. In this paper, we generalize the design of the Gaussian physical watermark by incorporating Bernoulli drops at the control inputs. This enables the operator to account for imperfect networks when designing a Gaussian watermark for secure detection. We also argue that using Bernoulli drops together with a Gaussian watermark can improve detection. This motivates the analysis and design of a joint Bernoulli-Gaussian watermark. In our preliminary work [16] , we proposed using packet drops in a setting without Gaussian watermarks to detect replay attacks. This article extends these results by providing a rigorous mathematical setting to jointly design parameters of both a Gaussian watermark and Bernoulli drop process.
We investigate two types of watermark design: 1) a watermark with an independent and identically distributed (IID) Gaussian additive input multiplied by a Markovian Bernoulli drop process at the control input and 2) a watermark with a stationary Gaussian additive input generated by a hidden Markov model (HMM) multiplied by an IID Bernoulli drop process at the control input. We incorporate a correlation detector [17] , [8] to recognize integrity attacks and characterize adversarial scenarios where the Bernoulli-Gaussian watermark is provably effective. Next, we provide efficiently solvable optimization problems to design parameters of the Gaussian input and the Bernoulli drop process. Simulation results illustrate scenarios where packet drops improve detection performance relative to a purely Gaussian watermark.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a discrete time LTI control system as follows
x k ∈ R n is the state vector at time k. A set of m sensor measurements y k ∈ R m is delivered to a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system at time k in order to perform remote estimation and compute an intended control input u k ∈ R p . A set of p control inputs u k,c ∈ R p actuate the system. We differentiate u k,c , the control input applied to the system, versus u k , the input computed by a SCADA operator. We assume w k ∼ N(0, Q) is IID process noise and v k ∼ N (0, R) is IID measurement noise (independent of {w k }), where Q 0, R 0. A Kalman filter performs state estimation as follows.
The defender minimizes a cost function J:
where W 0 and U 0. We assume (A, B) and (A, Q 
A. Control in Uncertain Networks
As shown in Fig. 1 , the control input u k may be dropped as it is sent from the SCADA system to the plant. Here,
where η k ∈ {0, 1} is a Bernoulli random variable. The control input u k may be dropped due to network imperfections. In this case, we assume the operator receives an acknowledgement (ACK), which specifies if u k was delivered. Alternatively, the input u k may be intentionally dropped as a means to watermark the system, enabling the detection of integrity attacks that fail to preserve the effect of the drop process. This strategy was initially investigated in [16] . We consider both IID and Markovian drop processes. 1) IID Bernoulli Process: First, we assume {η k } is an IID Bernoulli process where P (η k = 1) = 1 − p d . LQG control with IID Bernoulli packet losses was studied in [18] . Consider the information set optimal control strategy at time k given F k is as follows [16] , [18] :
As we expect the system has been running for a long time, both L k and S k have converged to fixed point values so that
In this setup, we assume there are Markovian packet losses [19] at the input where
Here, we assume 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < β ≤ 1 so that η k is irreducible. Moreover, we assume η k is stationary, which can be obtained by letting its initial distribution be P (η −∞ = 0) = β α+β . Finally, we assume that α and β are selected (or given) so that the system (1) can have finite cost J. The optimal strategy at time
where L (m) , R (m) , S (m) are parameters which converged to their steady state values. The resulting cost of control is
Remark 1: The prior strategies are optimal when the defender only has knowledge of the observed drop sequence η −∞:k−1 . However, if the drop sequence is intentionally introduced using a pseudo random number generator (PRNG), the defender knows future values of η k . The design of a controller that uses this information is left for future work.
B. Joint Bernoulli-Gaussian Physical Watermarking
To account for adversarial behavior, we consider additive Gaussian physical watermarks Δu k . First introduced in [5] to detect replay attacks, an additive Gaussian watermark can be leveraged to verify the freshness of outputs. We aim to intelligently combine the Gaussian watermarks considered in [8] and [9] with a Bernoulli drop process at the input. Such a design accomplishes two goals: 1) to expand the analysis of physical watermarking to a more realistic network setting with packet drops and 2) to potentially improve performance by considering a more general joint BernoulliGaussian watermark.
We consider two main joint designs. Watermark 1: IID Gaussian Input + Markovian Drops
{η k } is a Markovian Bernoulli process and
is an IID Gaussian watermark [5] . We assume Δu k is independent of other stochastic processes in the system. Watermark 2: Stationary Gaussian Input + IID Drops
In this case, {η k } is an IID Bernoulli process. The Gaussian input Δu k is assumed to be a stationary process generated by a hidden Markov model (HMM) as considered in [9] .
ζ k is the hidden state of the HMM, A ω has spectral radius ρ(A ω ) ≤ρ ≤ 1, and
Δu k is independent of other stochastic processes in the system. Remark 2: Here,ρ, the maximum allowable spectral radius, is a design parameter for the defender. We observe a largerρ improves expected detection performance. However, a largerρ means a larger correlation between watermarks and this could facilitate the prediction of future watermarks if the attacker guesses an initial Gaussian input Δu k .
III. ATTACK MODEL
In this section we describe a model of our adversary in terms of knowledge, capabilities, and potential strategies.
A. Attacker Capabilities
Without loss of generality, we assume an attack begins at time k = 0. We make the following assumptions.
1) The attacker can modify all measurements y k , k ≥ 0.
The falsified outputs at time k are denoted by y v k . 2) The attacker inserts an input B a u a k into the system. 3) The attacker is unable to read the true control inputs u k,c . As a result, he is unaware of the drop sequence {η k } and the Gaussian watermark {Δu k }.
The system under attack is given by 
B. Attack Strategy
The attacker generates y v k through a virtual system:
In the case of Watermark 1, (10) with parameters α and β and Δu 
The previous attack strategy can be generated (approximately) by a replay attack where the attacker records a long sequence of outputs y −T :−T +T and, starting at time 0, replaces y k with y
Attackers who do not have precise knowledge of the model may engage in replay attacks, which only require access to the outputs [5] , [8] , [9] . Alternatively, this attack strategy can be constructed by an adversary who is familiar with the model, for instance a malicious insider. In this case, the attacker simulates a virtual copy of the system dynamics to fool a bad data detector. It was previously shown [9] that if p d = 0 and there is no Gaussian watermark, the given strategies are asymptotically stealthy when A (A + BL (b) )(I − KC) is Schur stable.
A model aware attacker could also potentially pursue an additive attack, for instance a false data injection attack [20] or a zero dynamics attack [21] , [22] . In these attacks, the adversary injects an additive bias into the system which preserves the watermark and allows the attacker to remain stealthy. However, there are scenarios where additive attacks on sensor measurements are not feasible. As an example, suppose the defender uses public key cryptography, where a public key is used to encrypt the measurements while a private key is used to decrypt the associated cipher text. An attacker could send his own virtual measurements encrypted with the public key. However, such an attack could not leverage information in the true measurement as that would require access to the defender's private key to learn y k . In this case, additive attacks constructed by replacing a true output packet with a virtual packet would be infeasible. By assumption, an additive networked-based attack on the defender's control input is also impossible because the adversary is unable to read the defender's input.
We argue that alternative attack strategies which manipulate all sensors y k in a setting with public key cryptography also fail due to the fact that the resulting attack sequence {y v k } is independent of the watermarks {Δu k , η k }. Specifically, an attacker who is unable to read the inputs or outputs will have no information about the watermarks. As a result, the outputs he can construct will fail to fool the correlation detector, which we propose in the next section.
IV. A CORRELATION DETECTOR
We consider a correlation detector, proposed in [8] . The defender computes a virtual output y k , which explicitly characterizes the effect of watermarks on y k .
where with some abuse of notation x −∞ = 0,x −∞|−∞ = 0. We can simplify (20) and (21) to obtain
This virtual process created by the defender is driven entirely by the sequence of Bernoulli-Gaussian watermarks {Δu k , η k }. Thus, if we were to multiply the true outputs y k with the defender's virtual outputs y k we would expect a positive correlation. However, if an attacker introduces measurements y v k , which are driven by an independent sequence of watermarks, the expected correlation drops to 0. This motivates consideration of the detection statistic y T k y k , where a large statistic is indicative of normal behavior while a small statistic indicates malicious behavior. Observe due to the random real time selection of watermarks, y k 2 may be close to 0, impacting detector performance since the correlation will likely also approach 0 even under normal operation. As a result, we propose an event triggered detector:
The null hypothesis H 0 is that the system is operating without malicious behavior while the alternative hypothesis H 1 is that the system is under attack. W is the size of the detector's window. A detection event is triggered if y k 2 2 is greater than some user defined threshold μ, preventing false alarms from being raised when y k is small, while sacrificing time to detection. This tradeoff can be addressed by tuning μ. Note that κ corresponds to the time index of the event triggered correlation detector and increases at instants when a new detection statistic is computed. Identifying attacks on an individual sensor i can be done by focusing on the correlation between individual measurements. An appropriate statistic g 
Proof: Observe that y k can be written as a linear function of the Gaussian watermarks Δu k so that
where G j is some linear gain, determined by the sequence of Bernoulli drops η j:k−1 . Thus, we have
The proposed detector can often differentiate between faulty and malicious scenarios. During a fault, we expect to see the effect of the embedded watermarks in the output and it could be measured through correlation. Alternatively, residue based detectors such as a χ 2 detector (
, which measures the difference between measured and expected behavior, will likely raise an alarm during faulty behavior and malicious behavior. Both detectors can be used in tandem. A residue based detector can raise alarms in the case of faulty or malicious behavior, while a correlation detector can distinguish these events. In this article, we focus on the correlation detector.
V. THE FIRST WATERMARK DESIGN
We consider the design of a watermark consisting of an IID Gaussian input and Markovian drops. This requires the evaluation of a detection and performance trade-off. We wish to maximize the correlation of y k and y k to distinguish the system under attack from normal operation. However, we also need to ensure the system meets an adequate level of performance as characterized by the costJ, starting at k = 0.
As such, we design the parameters α, β, Q by solving the following optimization problem
To begin with, we use [19, Theorem 3] to analytically compute the costJ as follows.
Theorem 7: Suppose α and β are chosen so that the system has finite cost J (m) in the absence of a Gaussian watermark. The LQG costJ of the control system (1) with IID Gaussian and Markovian watermark (12) is:
Proof: Consider the cost to go in a finite hori-
Uu j,c |F k , and let u N,c = 0. Similar to, [19] , it can be shown that
where
Leveraging the fact that {η k } is stationary with P (η k = 0) = β α+β as well as (29) and (30), we obtain We now compute the expected correlation without attacks.
Theorem 8: Suppose α and β are chosen so the resulting system has finite cost J (m) [19] [Theorem 3] in the absence of a Gaussian watermark. Then, for the control system (1) with IID Gaussian and Markovian watermark (12), we have
We begin with the Lemma below.
T . The proof is found in an extended version of this article [23] . The closed loop dynamics are
where e k = x k −x k|k . From (22) , when η k = 1. we obtain
T , where we implicitly condition on H 0 . x k is independent of Δu k , w k , e k and Δu k is independent of x k , w k , e k . Thus,
Next, since the Markov process is stationary and x k , x k and η k are conditionally independent given η k−1 , we observe
It can be similarly shown that
Since L 0 is stable,
are obtained by solving a fixedpoint equation which has a unique solution X 0 and X 1 . (32) immediately follows from (37). Next, we find that
Finally, we observe that
Thus, the watermark design problem (26) is given by
(40) For fixed α and β, the problem is an efficiently solvable semidefinite program. However, to optimize over α and β, we have to solve multiple instances of the problem over a finite 2 dimensional space. Ideally a designer will sample the space sufficiently. Note, not all (α, β) in (0, 1] × (0, 1] are feasible as some selections of α and β lead to unbounded cost. Likewise, there may be naturally occurring drops which constrain α and β. For instance, if we add an artificial Markovian drop process on top of a naturally occurring IID drop process with drop probability p d , we know that
Remark 10: The optimal design of Watermark 1 requires solving multiple instances of a convex optimization problem with parameters varying over a bounded 2 dimensional space. This will also be true for Watermark 2. A formulation that considers a stationary Gaussian input with a Markovian drop process is nontrivial. Even if analysis can be performed, optimal design will likely require searching over 3 dimensions. This more complicated case is left for future work.
VI. THE SECOND WATERMARK DESIGN
We now investigate a watermark consisting of stationary Gaussian noise generated by a HMM (14) and an IID Bernoulli drop process at the control input with drop probability equal to p d . Again, we design a watermark to address a performance and security trade-off. We wish to solve:
Rather than optimizing over the parameters of the HMM, we instead optimize over the autocovariance functions
For tractable analysis we replace the constraint ρ(A ω ) ≤ρ with the following related assumption. Assumption 1: Let Γ(d) be an autocovariance function for a Gaussian process generated by an HMM (A ω , C h , Ψ) . Then
is a autocovariance function of a stationary Gaussian process.
Γ(d) can be potentially realized by an alternate HMM
Note, that if ρ(A ω ) >ρ, (42) can not be a stationary process. This HMM can be realized if and only if Cov(
2 is positive semidefinite. Remark 11: Whenρ = 1, Assumption 1, introduces no relaxation. In fact, the resulting formulation optimizes all stationary Gaussian processes in general. However, in the caseρ = 1, we will prove that the resulting Gaussian process {Δu k } is entirely deterministic except for the initial watermark. A lower parameterρ reduces average performance, but prevents an attacker who learns or guesses the current hidden state from adequately predicting future watermarks. We arrive at a relaxed formulation to (41) below.
Theorem 12: Consider the control system (1) with IID Bernoulli and stationary Gaussian watermark (14) . Suppose p d is chosen so that the system has finite cost J (b) [19] [Theorem 3] in the absence of a Gaussian watermark. An equivalent formulation to (41) after replacing the constraint ρ(A ω ) ≤ρ with Assumption 1 is given by
There is also an optimal solution (H * , ω * , p d * ) such that H * = hh H where h H denotes the conjugate transpose of h ∈ C p . Letting Re and Im be the real and imaginary parts of a matrix/vector, respectively, an optimal A ω , C h , Ψ is
The proof is similar in nature to the proof of Theorem 6 in [9] . A sketch is found in [23] . For fixed p d and ω, the proposed problem is an efficiently solvable semidefinite program. To approximate a global maximum, we solve the problem repeatedly over the space 0 ≤ ω ≤ 0.5 and 0 ≤ p d ≤ 1. For sufficiently large p d , the costJ becomes infinite in open loop unstable systems [18] , limiting the feasible space. We can account for natural packet drops in the system as before. For instance, if the input is dropped naturally with probability p d , we have
Remark 13: An optimal watermark for a given p d = p d * may have better detection performance than the globally optimal watermark. Future work aims to use objective functions that better highlight the relative performance of watermarks.
Remark 14: While packet drops at the sensor measurements are not modeled in this paper, our framework could be extended to address this behavior without significantly changing the formulations of the proposed optimization problems. The main effect of packet drops at the sensor side is a time varying Kalman gain. The objective function and increase in costJ due to the Gaussian portion of the watermark are not affected by time variations in the Kalman gain in both watermarking settings. Both J (m) and J (b) can be empirically evaluated for fixed (α, β) and p d , respectively, to account for packet drops at the sensor measurements.
VII. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we illustrate the performance of the proposed watermarking designs through extensive numerical results. We tested our watermark designs in various randomly generated systems and, unless otherwise stated, averaged results over 1500 trials. Replay attacks are considered.
In Fig. 2 , we utilize Watermark 1, which has a Markovian drop process defined by parameters (α, β) and an IID Gaussian watermark. The watermark is tested on a randomly generated open loop stable system with 5 states, 4 inputs, and 2 outputs. We plot the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for both the proposed correlation detector and a χ 2 detector. The χ 2 detector serves as a benchmark, having been previously used for attack detection [5] , [8] , [10] , [16] in watermarked systems. The threshold μ is chosen to be a constant multiple of lim k→∞ E[y T k y k ]. The ROC curves are collected at multiple different costs ΔJ = 1.05J * , ΔJ = 0.45J * and ΔJ = 0.15J * . Here, ΔJ represent the increase in the costJ relative to optimal cost J * without drops or a Gaussian watermark. We compare a system with drops (α = 0.69, β = 0.9) to a system without drops (α = 1, β = 0). The proposed detector outperforms the χ 2 detector in all cases and packet drops improve the ROC curve for both detectors. The improvement appears to be higher for moderately valued ΔJ before saturating. In Fig.  3 , we plot the expected time to detection for both detectors in a system with Watermark 1. The packet drop process introduces an additional delay in the time to detection though this additional time is less significant as ΔJ is increased.
In Fig. 4 , we introduce Watermark 2, which has IID drops (with probability of drop p d ) and a stationary Gaussian watermark. The watermark is added to a randomly generated open loop stable system with 6 states, 5 inputs, and 5 outputs. We plot ROC curves generated by both the correlation detector and χ 2 detector for a system with drops (p d = 0.6) and a system without drops In Figs. 6 and 7, we plot χ 2 detector and correlation detector statistics (averaged over 500 trials) during a fault in the system. The fault introduced (at time 210) is a constant additive bias added to a subset of sensors (i.e. due to disturbances/sensor drift). While the χ 2 detector raises an alarm, the correlation detector does not since the watermark is preserved in the system. This motivates the use of both the correlation and χ 2 detector to distinguish faults from attacks. If both detectors raise an alarm, indicating the watermark is absent in the outputs, we consider a likely attack scenario. If only the χ 2 detector raises an alarm, we expect that the watermark is preserved while the dynamics are inconsistent with modeling. As such, we anticipate a fault. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we showed how to incorporate Bernoulli packet drops at the control input in the design of physical watermarks. We argued that packet drops can be beneficial for detection and consequently considered the design of a joint Bernoulli-Gaussian watermark to detect integrity attacks. We proposed two main watermark designs in conjunction with a correlation detector and provided efficiently solvable optimization problems to address the trade-off between detection and control performances. In future work we aim to generalize our watermarking approach to allow us to drop either the entire control input or the Gaussian portion of the watermark. We also hope to conduct testing in real systems.
